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be needed to make them really effective. But enough has perhaps been said to indicate that Professor Urwick's volume is well worthy of the perusal both of philosophers and reformers. No reader can fail to see that it is the work of a mind that is alive and in living contact with social problems.

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A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF BERGSON'S PHILOSOPHY. By J. McKellar Stewart, D.Phil. London: Macmillan & Co., 1911. Pp. x, 304.

To Dr. Stewart the division between Intelligence and Intuition is fundamental in Bergson's philosophy; he is said to regard the former, roughly, as Kant did, but to assert that it is only a fragment of the faculty of knowledge. Dr. Stewart's conclusion is that this doctrine is unsupported by argument and that it fails to solve the difficulties which it claims to destroy. The present book, then, is throughout concerned with this central doctrine as it is developed in Bergson's writings. The expository section is full of repetition, a fault almost unavoidable in criticizing such a writer; it is aggravated, however, by the arrangement of the book, which has an introduction, an exposition, a criticism, and a final estimate. In itself the exposition is full and clear, and will be useful even to the close student of Bergson.

The work, however, is professedly critical. As such it has one very considerable merit, especially in an author who disagrees with the new philosophy: it is genuinely sympathetic, for Dr. Stewart does try to get at Bergson's meaning. Three remarks may be made on this aspect of the book: 1. Dr. Stewart's criticisms seem on the whole sound and conclusive against Bergson. 2. But several points are passed over in silence which might be vigorously controverted; these occur chiefly in Bergson's discussions of mathematics and logic. 3. And towards the end we hear frequently of an easy solution for the difficulties which have prompted Bergson, which, however, seems fully as mysterious as anything the latter has ever said and for which absolutely no reason is given. I shall say a little under each of these heads.

1. Dr. Stewart is right in emphasizing the unpragmatic

nature of Bergson's philosophy. He points out very well that the view taken of the intellect is arbitrarily abstract, and that at any grade the intellect is concerned with a good deal that is not space or matter: he destroys the view that we can deduce the form of the intellect from its function. He also notes that it is very doubtful if 'intuition' can be called knowledge. (Unfortunately for Bergson, we too have instincts, and there seems no knowledge in them.) His criticism of the ideal genesis of matter and intelligence is also good. Why should the original activity be interrupted at all, and why should it immediately be degraded? "One is forced to the conclusion that Bergson has no clear idea of matter, or, if he has, he has not made his meaning plain" (p. 188). In the genesis of intelligence, on the other hand, it is assumed that mind must become that which it knows. He notes that space and pure homogeneity are simply *not* synonymous, and that Bergson here asserts both that mathematics and physics merely over-accentuate the spatiality of matter, and that mathematics is a veritable means of contact with the absolute.

In short, Bergson has a gratuitously narrow view of reason and intelligence, taken from Kant, and he outdoes Kant in ultimately making space the one category. This must lead to scepticism, if we fail to find an escape in 'intuition.' But Bergson's account of this is equally unsatisfactory. For the doctrine of space is fallacious; we cannot get behind our spatial experience to see how it originated. The doctrine of homogeneous time is inexpugnable merely because of Bergson's definition of space. And thirdly, there is no reason at all why what is described as Duration should be called time. Bergson never distinguishes succession and the conditions of our consciousness of succession: moreover he *has* to admit succession in the material world (p. 225). The intuition of duration does not add to our knowledge: the duration in which we see ourselves acting is never that in which we act, and the latter in Bergson is just as Mr. Bradley's undifferentiated feeling. We can, however, have a *knowledge* of difference, for example, in the self: the introduction of difference is not a negation of judgment.

As for the defence of freedom, it removes freedom from the higher stages of our lives, and cannot explain the inter-connection of the phases in the experience called 'mine.' It is based

on a complete misunderstanding of 'mechanical causality,' confusing it with the conditions of knowing it.

The intuitive method, indeed, involves the assumption that we cannot know things as they are. Bergson is met with the Kantian puzzle regarding the relation of the categories and their raw material. Philosophy should be inarticulate, and we are led straight to scepticism. And, thinks Dr. Stewart, there are evident signs in Bergson of a revolt against the fundamental opposition of intelligence and intuition.

2. Dr. Stewart does not note what must have struck many readers, especially of the "Essai." That work shows that Bergson is a visualizer; and since, as Dr. Stewart does note, Bergson constantly confuses the conditions of knowledge with the intelligible nature of the object of knowledge, this accounts for his amazing account of how we count and arrange things in 'time.' Bergson always confuses psychology and logic, and his psychology itself is sufficiently wonderful.

Dr. Stewart talks of "an ideal space . . . which is the space of geometry" (p. 215). He seems to think that geometry is necessarily a science dealing with a space which is given, as chemistry deals with 'chemicals' which are given. Consequently, he cannot show how completely Bergson misunderstands the entire nature of mathematics. His remarks on space and time (pp. 219ff.) show a like ignorance of modern work in logic, and are of little value.

3. Dr. Stewart apparently thinks it a weighty recommendation of anything he says, that it is "in line with the best traditions of idealism" (p. 246): this is taken as synonymous with having "hearty acceptance in most quarters worth considering." It is certainly no recommendation of anything he says about mathematics, or of the following points.

Kant, we are told, should not have adopted the classification of judgments in formal logic as a clue to the categories: he should have proceeded from "the reflective analysis of the functioning unity itself" (p. 167, and *cf.* p. 193). If so, it is hard that Bergson should be chastized for telling us how matter and intelligence have occurred, especially as *he* refers to empirical data somehow or other.

"Self-conscious life is the highest manifestation of life which we *can* know. All the other forms of life, then, which we are capable of knowing, must of necessity be known in terms of

our own self-conscious life. As Professor Caldwell puts it: "Thought is not *outside* things, but latent in them . . . '" (pp. 183, 184). None of these sentences has a clear meaning, and there is no connection between them, whatever clear meaning be given to them: yet they seem the pith of his philosophy.

Dr. Stewart frequently observes that we do know things, but he says "things as they exist for themselves." Surely he means "as they are," and the other phrase has an illicit implication.

It is implied (on p. 230) that strength of consciousness (whatever that is) is in direct proportion to "clearness of conceptual articulation." Assuming that this is not a definition, what fact does it state?

Personal consciousness is an organism, to understand which we must think of its parts. We do so when we see that they are "factors of a judgment of some kind, which in its turn is an activity of conscious mind in pursuit of an end which is ultimately its own self-realization." "All the judgments or functions of unity are shown to have their source in a self-conscious soul or subject" (p. 233). What this means is not clear at all; the single phrase "self-realization" has no clear connection with "self" and the usual sense of "realization": those in the quarters worth considering should be aware of this nowadays.

Again, Dr. Stewart says that Bergson has given an inadequate analysis of motive, in his account of freedom (p. 263). Our beliefs are "*ours* because *we* have, explicitly or implicitly, attributed to them the predicate 'good'" (p. 251): this seems simply but entirely false! This self is "an organism of conceptual elements." "It is primarily and fundamentally a self whose very existence consists in this re-creation of itself which, we may say [why?], takes place in the practical judgment (however vague it may be, and whatever form it may take) that life is unconditionally good" (p. 253). This is so qualified that it may mean anything, but that is no reason for saying it, and it does not seem true.

The subjective function "as such" (as if we cared about it as not such) can never become an object of presentation: it is quite plain from this that it can be an object of thought, anyhow. Again, "feeling is entirely subjective" (p. 260): is thought (*i. e.*, my thinking) not subjective in the same sense,

and is anything 'psychical' not so subjective? This sort of thought is plausible only because of the hopeless ambiguity of its technical terms, which have the same sound as so many popular words.

Dr. Stewart is quite certain about freedom. "We *know* that we are free. . . . Free activity is immediately grasped in feeling" (p. 262). But on the same authority, his own, feeling can never become cognitive, being purely subjective: it does not involve the subject-object relation (p. 259).

I have said enough to show that the appeal to the tradition of idealism is a serious one; it ought to be clear that it is not a proof of this amazing psychology and metaphysics.

Dr. Stewart seeks to give us an intellectual category which Bergson thinks of little use. "The truly causal interpretation is, implicitly, to some extent at any rate, teleological" (p. 271). Again note the qualifications! But it is certain that teleology is only the assertion of a certain sort of cause, about which the principle of causality says nothing, any more than it does, *e. g.*, about a physical cause: any other interpretation of causality seems useless and allogical. "The cause . . . can be clearly defined only in the effect" (p. 271). As a matter of fact, the principle directly implies that *each* can be defined separately, so far as it is concerned.

Dr. Stewart concludes, therefore, that we need not supplement the nature of intelligence by intuition, but simply by feeling and will (p. 281). These are "undeniable aspects of our consciousness, and must not be omitted in any attempt to decipher the meaning of the universe." But this is true only as it is of any fact, mechanical or otherwise: the nature of intelligence is not supplemented thereby. Genius brings humanity to a self-realization immediately perceived as such (p. 292), but such intuitions cannot be methodized. The ultimate nature of such personality is unity in difference (p. 300): but what has unity in difference to do with persons more than with other things?

In short, the book suffers from repetition, and from overloading with a philosophy which goes beyond Bergson in vagueness, mystery, and lack of argument, and the reader at the end may have well forgotten the quite excellent passages of exposition and criticism in its earlier parts. It is time that all realized that the age of this 'idealism' as having a monopoly

of critical and philosophic merit, has gone. It may still be expounded and argued for, no doubt, but it cannot be quoted as in itself a necessary or sufficient reason for saying anything.

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MODERN SCIENCE AND THE ILLUSIONS OF PROFESSOR BERGSON.

By Hugh S. R. Elliot; with a Preface by Sir Ray Lankester.

London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912. Pp. xix, 257.

Mr. Elliot is concerned here with M. Bergson's philosophy only so far as it claims to be based upon scientific facts and to account for the process of evolution. He gives a sufficiently clear and succinct account of the doctrines he is attacking (ch. II), and criticises them in detail (ch. III): the criticism is burdened with repetition and cannot be called concise. His other chapters, forming the major part of the book, attack metaphysics and defend mechanism. Science and he have no metaphysics: a judgment is the connection of two terms, and there is no term outside the universe and, therefore, no possible judgment about it. A very inadequate chapter on the history of philosophy backs this up. He defends "epiphenomenalism," as a theory now "known" by science: the mental states, however, are not "caused," since that is a term applicable only to matter and motion; nevertheless, he is a strict determinist. "Facts" alone can settle the question, and there is no intervention of a spiritual factor in science or art.

The book will not add to anyone's knowledge of science, and as philosophy it seems very inadequate and crude. But it demolishes much of the new philosophy.

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LAUGHTER: AN ESSAY ON THE MEANING OF THE COMIC. By

Henri Bergson. Authorized translation by Clondesley Brereton and Fred Rothwell. London: Macmillan & Co., 1911. Pp. 200.

This is a fascinating work, with all the clearness characteristic of French criticism and the carefulness of a philosophic thinker, and it is excellently done into English. But few will be converted to M. Bergson's theory of the comic.